Paradigm Shifts in Economic Theory and Policy by Laybourn-Langton, L & Jacobs, M
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
113
Forum
to the post-war consensus, covering the period from the 
Wall Street Crash of 1929 to the implementation of mainly 
Keynesian economic orthodoxy and policy approaches in 
the post-war period. The second was from the post-war 
consensus to neoliberalism, starting with the currency 
and oil shocks of the early 1970s and the adoption of free 
market economic policies in the 1980s, ushering in the 
current period of neoliberalism.2
Theoretical models of paradigm change
Each period of change featured a series of economic and 
political crises, the failure of orthodox ideas and policies 
to explain and respond to them, and the resultant re-
placement of the orthodoxy by a new approach. A body 
of literature has sought to understand this change pro-
cess, inﬂ uenced by Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts in 
the natural sciences. According to this theory, change oc-
curs when two conditions are met: ﬁ rst, a critical mass in 
the number or importance of “anomalies” which contra-
dict the dominant paradigm, and second, the successful 
development of an alternative theory that better explains 
the prevailing evidence.3
Lakatos built on these ideas, arguing that changes in sci-
ence could be seen in terms of “research programmes” 
that are either “progressive” or “degenerating”.4 Progres-
sive programmes advance new theories and adopt ideas 
that better explain reality. In contrast, degenerating pro-
grammes persist with old theories and ideas, despite their 
failure to explain the available evidence, and so eventu-
ally abdicate their previous status as progressive pro-
grammes. Degenerating programmes can have undue 
staying power, enjoying an incumbency advantage under-
pinned by the vested interests of leading scientists. A shift 
in paradigm only occurs when progressive programmes 
gather sufﬁ cient support to overcome the hold of a de-
2 The term “neoliberalism” is controversial in some circles, since it can 
carry strongly pejorative rather than merely descriptive connotations. 
We use it here as a conveniently descriptive term to characterise the 
dominant set of “free market” theories, values and policies. For more 
on the uses of the term “neoliberalism”, see O.M. H a r t w i c h , R. S a l -
l y : Neoliberalism: The genesis of a political swearword, CIS Occa-
sional Paper No. 114, 2009.
3 T. K u h n : The Structure of Scientiﬁ c Revolutions, Chicago 1962, Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
4 I. L a k a t o s : Criticism and the Methodology of Scientiﬁ c Research 
Programmes, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 69, 
1968, pp. 149-186.
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This paper seeks to understand the processes of paradigm 
shifts in economic ideas and policy. We begin with an ex-
planation of the concept of a “politico-economic paradigm”, 
with reference to the theory and history of the two paradigm 
shifts occurring in the 20th century. We then examine how 
the second of these, the shift to “neoliberalism”, occurred. 
The ﬁ nal section assesses the degree to which economic 
and political conditions since the ﬁ nancial crisis offer an op-
portunity for a new paradigm shift away from neoliberalism.
Politico-economic paradigms
Modern economic history can be roughly split into differ-
ent eras in which certain sets of ideas have dominated 
politics and policy. We shall refer to a dominant group of 
ideas as a politico-economic paradigm. Such paradigms 
generally encompass political/economic goals, analyti-
cal/theoretical frameworks for understanding the func-
tioning of economies and societies, narratives which de-
scribe and justify the goals and analytical framework, as 
well as economic and social policies, based on the ana-
lytical framework, that seek to achieve speciﬁ c goals.
Politico-economic paradigms can exert a powerful inﬂ u-
ence over academic and media debates, as well as on 
policymaking institutions, both national and international. 
Over the last hundred years, Western political economy 
has broadly experienced two major periods of breakdown 
and transition from one politico-economic paradigm to 
another.1 The ﬁ rst was from the laissez-faire paradigm 
© The Author(s) 2018. Open Access: This article is distributed under the 
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unre-
stricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, 
provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if chang-
es were made.
1 Our analysis in this section is based on A. S t i r l i n g , L. L a y b o u r n -
L a n g t o n : Time for a New Paradigm? Past and Present Transitions 
in Economic Policy, in: The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 4, 2017, 
pp. 558-569.
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weaknesses in the productive capacity of economies, 
particularly in the UK.
Breakdown and transition in orthodoxy: The phenom-
enon of stagﬂ ation (simultaneously high inﬂ ation and 
unemployment) contradicted the Phillips Curve, while 
the failure of policies targeting prices and incomes to 
control inﬂ ation, or currency devaluation to restore com-
petitiveness, left few available policy options within the 
Keynesian framework. Overall, a critical mass of Kuhni-
an anomalies led to the degeneration of the incumbent 
politico-economic paradigm. An alternative progressive 
programme emerged, marking itself in opposition to 
Keynesian collectivism. As politicians and policymakers 
cast around for solutions to the crisis, the proponents of 
this new approach seemed to offer an escape from in-
stability.
New economic policy: Following continual growth in sup-
port from policymakers throughout the 1970s, the elec-
tions of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in 
1980 marked the full-ﬂ edged emergence of a new para-
digm. To a lesser extent, this new paradigm also entered 
into German and French politics with the election of Hel-
mut Kohl and after President François Mitterrand’s “so-
cialist experiment”. New governments precipitated a third 
order change in policy, switching the principal object of 
macroeconomic policy from unemployment to inﬂ ation. 
While monetarism was soon abandoned, the wider neo-
liberal worldview took hold. The state’s economic role was 
drastically diminished to a guarantor of stable economic 
conditions, alongside signiﬁ cant reductions in taxes and 
spending, the deregulation of markets, and curtailment of 
trade unions.
Understanding the neoliberal shift
The shift to neoliberalism was not an accident of history, 
but the partial result of the efforts of an elite movement, 
initially comprising a small group of academics organised 
in the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS), founded in 1947. The 
Society served as the nexus through which a critique of 
the post-war settlement and the diverse tenets of neo-
liberalism were generated, as well as a concerted pro-
gramme of institution-building and political strategy. To 
understand the way in which the paradigm shift occurred, 
it is helpful to disaggregate it into three components or 
levels:
a. its intellectual and academic underpinning, particularly 
within economics;
b. the discourses and narratives through which it was ex-
pressed in the wider public domain;
generating programme and a tipping point is reached, af-
ter which the old programme is superseded.
While providing useful heuristics, these theories never-
theless need careful application in the ﬁ eld of economics 
and public policy, which is fundamentally uncertain and in 
which hypotheses can never be irrefutably falsiﬁ ed. Eco-
nomic policy is developed through a process of political 
choices and “social learning” in which policymakers de-
cide on new goals and methods with only partial reference 
to academic theory or evidence. The inherent uncertainty 
of economic prediction and the political nature of poli-
cymaking make it easier for degenerating programmes 
to retain their incumbency advantage, aided by vested 
interests. Hall argued that economic policy can exhibit 
three “orders” of change, increasing in their magnitude: 
adjustment of an existing policy, change in the policy and 
change in the goals of policy altogether.5 In Hall’s concep-
tion, it is the third order of change which corresponds to a 
paradigm shift in the politico-economic orthodoxy.
Characterising the shift to the neoliberal paradigm
Similar patterns of change can be observed in both of the 
politico-economic paradigm shifts which occurred in the 
20th century. Here, we use the theories described above 
to set out the key characteristics of the shift process, il-
lustrated by the transition from the post-war paradigm to 
neoliberalism in the 1980s.
The prevailing orthodoxy: Since WWII, rising economic 
growth and incomes cemented the social democratic 
consensus into a Kuhnian worldview. Keynesian demand 
management led to the targeting of full employment as 
the primary indicator of economic success. By the 1960s, 
policymakers were placing considerable weight on the 
Phillips Curve – the apparent trade-off between unem-
ployment and inﬂ ation – to guide the management of the 
economy. The ﬁ xed exchange rate regime of the Bretton 
Woods settlement and ﬁ nancial regulation provided sta-
ble conditions for the growth of international trade.
Economic shocks and crisis: The breakdown of the inter-
national monetary order in the wake of the US leaving the 
gold standard led to a deterioration in several countries’ 
balance of payments positions, driving inﬂ ation higher. 
The decision by oil producers to raise oil prices added to 
the inﬂ ationary shock, precipitating recessions. A long-
term decline in the competitiveness of signiﬁ cant indus-
trial sectors and poor industrial relations exposed severe 
5 P. H a l l : Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case 
of Economic Policymaking in Britain, in: Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, 
No. 3, 1993.
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tures that would harness the inevitable self-interest of 
public servants. Theories of regulatory capture used the 
public choice assumption to conclude all regulators are 
self-interested.
These insights added up to a coherent whole with a pow-
er greater than the sum of its parts. Not only did it provide 
a counter-narrative to the failures of the mainstream po-
litico-economic paradigm in the 1970s, but the combina-
tion of these ideas appeared to offer a more “scientiﬁ c” 
analysis of the economy and society than offered by the 
Keynesian orthodoxy. Moreover, it presented plausible 
solutions at a time when the previous policy was failing 
– a result in part of the pleasing inner logic of much of 
neoliberal thought. Importantly, these analyses and their 
attendant policies were attractively sold as having a uni-
versality that would serve different times and places and 
which allowed for better understanding of economic ac-
tors.
While hegemonic across politics and policy, it is important 
to recognise that neoliberalism was never all-encompass-
ing within the academic realm. Whereas in the natural sci-
ences, a Kuhnian paradigm shift will lead to the near-uni-
versal adoption of the new theory, this is less likely in the 
more uncertain social sciences. The neoliberal framework 
gradually came to dominate leading economic journals 
and textbooks, but signiﬁ cant debate remained within dis-
ciplines, and in macroeconomics in particular there were 
accommodations between old and new approaches. In the 
case of new classical economics, the attempt to change 
macroeconomics in both theory and practice only led to 
victory in the latter. In general, hegemonic change in aca-
demia is neither likely nor necessary to generate a para-
digm shift in the wider world. For such a shift to occur, 
sufﬁ cient change at an opportune time must be combined 
with attractive and seemingly coherent concepts and nar-
ratives.
A coherent narrative
The MPS members’ initial ideas were marked by dispute, 
contradiction and divergence – but they ultimately led to 
the emergence of a coherent narrative. Hayek founded 
the MPS to create a safe space for those with shared phil-
osophical ideas and political ideals to learn, educate and 
strive toward a common cause. In doing so, he followed a 
reﬂ exive model for changing the intellectual and practical 
elements of a paradigm. Academia creates the tools for 
and legitimises the cause of a political project, which, in 
turn, inﬂ uences academia through social learning, moral-
ity and values, and material factors, such as increases in 
funding and other incumbency advantages resulting from 
a higher proﬁ le and greater inﬂ uence. Two conditions are 
c. the political policies and processes – notably the elec-
tions of governments – which enabled it to be imple-
mented.
The neoliberal movement started with an intellectual and 
academic component through the MPS. It then built a co-
herent narrative and policy proposals to spread its ideas, 
performed by a well-resourced ecosystem of institutions 
and networks mobilised to inﬂ uence public debate and 
political processes. Though the academic level is often 
thought of as most important to the rise of neoliberalism, 
the shift was actually weakest there; some neoliberal ide-
as were powerful but never became hegemonic. It was 
stronger at the level of discourse and narrative, where it 
came to dominate the way in which economic analysis 
and policy were discussed in public debate. It was only 
decisive at the level of politics and policy: the election of 
neoliberal-inﬂ uenced governments ensured a full para-
digm shift.
The academic level: multi-disciplinary, not hegemonic
The MPS always stressed the need for the neoliberal in-
tellectual project to be multi-disciplinary. From the start, 
philosophical, historical, legal, political and natural sci-
ence concepts were used alongside economics. Inevita-
bly, this resulted in differing paths of development across 
disciplines and countries. For example, there was a con-
siderable difference between the ﬁ rst Chicago School of 
Frank Knight, which had similarities with ordoliberalism 
in Germany, and the second Chicago School of Milton 
Friedman, whose more radical critique of the state came 
to underpin the development of Anglo-American capital-
ism.
In the US and the UK, Friedman’s monetarist theory was 
joined by a number of other socio-economic theories 
that spanned disciplines. New Classical economists 
suggested that macroeconomic models must include 
rigorous microeconomic parameters that reﬂ ected the 
decision-making behaviours which, in their view, gov-
erned human beings and societies. This required a re-
turn to neoclassical foundations, eventually emerging 
in the theory of rational expectations. In game theory, 
the rational expectations assumption was given a theo-
retical underpinning that drew on the natural sciences. 
Though early game theoretic models appeared only 
to be applicable in extreme circumstances, their as-
sumptions and theoretical insights were soon adopted 
by those modelling the behaviour of institutions. Public 
choice theory condemned the idea of the “public inter-
est” as a subjective hypocrisy used to mask the self-
interest of bureaucrats and politicians, suggesting that 
government should operate a system of incentive struc-
Intereconomics 2018 | 3
116
Forum
By the early 1970s, the neoliberal counter-orthodoxy had 
organised into a transatlantic network. Its members were 
well-resourced and mobilised, inﬂ uencing elite groups, 
political parties and individuals, seeking out and assimi-
lating allied concepts, and fashioning narratives to appeal 
to political needs. In doing so, they soon led the critique of 
the incumbent paradigm as it began to falter in the 1970s.
From crisis to government
By the late 1970s, this network and its ideas had increas-
ingly populated political parties and government insti-
tutions, developing strong networks of individuals that 
spanned important sectional interests. This ecosystem 
created the intellectual conditions for change, ensuring 
that the neoliberal movement was prepared to capitalise 
on crisis. The policy impotence of the incumbent post-war 
paradigm gave the movement its chance. In the end, suc-
cessive crises both intellectually and politically delegiti-
mised the post-war consensus. But it was the elections 
of right-wing political parties under Thatcher and Reagan 
that enabled the political displacement of the post-war 
paradigm in practice. Explicitly inﬂ uenced by neoliberal 
networks, the Republican and Conservative governments 
of the 1980s gradually introduced policies of deregula-
tion, privatisation, tax reductions and labour market “ﬂ ex-
ibility”, radically changing the political economy of the US 
and UK, and eventually, by wider transmission, that of 
most other Western nations.
Meanwhile, changes to the economic curriculum in uni-
versities and the adoption of neoliberal assumptions 
across the ﬁ eld of economic understanding and practice 
had a deep socio-cultural effect, entrenching the idea 
that economic and political freedoms can be equated and 
elevating deregulated markets as the only efﬁ cient mech-
anism for allocating resources. A crucial result was the 
acceptance by previously oppositional parties of key as-
pects of the neoliberal consensus. Consequently, by the 
end of the 1980s, even the elections of more left-leaning 
governments did not alter some of the fundamental tenets 
of either ideas or policy. The shift in economic thinking 
has often been seen as less pronounced in continental 
Europe than in the US and UK. But it has nevertheless 
been signiﬁ cant, particularly in Germany, with the 1982 
Wendepapier (reform paper) and the election of Helmut 
Kohl precipitating a neoliberal turn.6
6 T. F r i c k e : Altes Einheitsdenken oder neue Vielfalt? Eine sys-
tematische Auswertung der großen Umfragen unter Deutschlands 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftlern, FGW Studie Neues ökonomisches Den-
ken 03, 2017, Forschungsinstitut für gesellschaftliche Weiterentwick-
lung.
essential to realising change through this model. First, 
ideas must form part of a coherent narrative that can be 
easily shared and adapted without central control. Sec-
ond, an extensive, well-resourced ecosystem of enabling 
institutions and networks must be developed.
In the 1940s and 1950s, the MPS coalesced around an 
opposition to “collectivism”, concluding that an increased 
role for the state in economic and social management 
was incompatible with individual freedom. Recognising 
that they shared a critique of the new social democratic 
order, the early years of the MPS were dominated by the 
development of a statement of aims to act as a focal point 
for those seeking to move from opposition to proposition. 
Crucially, this statement of aims is political and deﬁ nes a 
clear ideological direction; it is neither an academic nor a 
technical document, and it does not focus purely on a cri-
tique of the incumbent paradigm. This allowed the state-
ment to provide a clear signal to those with views sympa-
thetic to those of the MPS and a focus for the movement’s 
activities. In doing so, it allowed for the decentralisation of 
both the development of the intellectual component of a 
new paradigm and the ecosystem that would bring it into 
practice.
A supporting ecosystem
A common narrative based around the MPS statement of 
aims helped bind the incipient movement together. But it 
needed an ecosystem of people, networks and institu-
tions to propagate it within the public sphere. This eco-
system was developed by key individuals with a strong 
understanding of power and how knowledge is transmit-
ted into action. Its leading ﬁ gures were Hayek and Fried-
man, who effectively acted as nodal points, connecting 
different elements of the ecosystem.
This was an elite theory of change that focused on in-
ﬂ uencing current and future opinion leaders. The trans-
mission mechanism from ideas to practice started in 
private via platforms, such as the MPS, that afforded se-
curity and limited scrutiny. After building coalitions, many 
members of the MPS went back to academia, from where 
they predominantly originated, to promote and develop 
neoliberal ideas. Soon, the support of wealthy interests 
– including the Volker Fund, Relm Foundation, General 
Electric and DuPont – enabled more meetings, networks 
and academic work. These resources were soon used to 
create a new breed of “knowledge professional” located 
within the new institutional form of the modern think tank 
– politically partisan and focused on strategic inﬂ uence 
as well as policy development. Journalists then provided 
the means by which neoliberal ideas could enter wider 
circulation.
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liberal paradigm rather than simply continuing the same 
one they inherited. The idea of modiﬁ cation allows for the 
fact that change can and does occur in the nature of a 
paradigm without resulting in its complete replacement. 
Of course, the dividing line between modiﬁ cation and re-
placement can always be contested.
After the ﬁ nancial crash: a new paradigm shift?
To what extent do today’s economic and political condi-
tions offer parallels with previous shifts? We can use the 
schematic from above to examine both similarities and 
differences.
The prevailing orthodoxy
It is not hard to show that the neoliberal consensus – al-
beit in a modiﬁ ed form – has remained dominant in public 
discourse and policymaking in most developed countries 
since the early 1980s. Contrary to many people’s expec-
tations, it largely survived the ﬁ nancial crash, with the 
short period of Keynesian stimulus in the immediate af-
termath of the crash in 2007-08 quickly replaced by aus-
terity policies. These have been based on the orthodox 
view that public borrowing and spending are not appro-
priate instruments to ameliorate recession when public 
debt is high. While there has been some reform of bank-
ing regulation to reduce systemic risk, there has been lit-
tle wider reform of the ﬁ nancial sector. In most countries, 
economic policy has failed to deal with continuing weak-
nesses in productivity, earnings and investment since the 
crisis. Given the scale of the crash and the slowness of 
recovery, the lack of economic policy innovation over the 
last decade is testament to the endurance of the neolib-
eral consensus.
Economic shocks and crisis
There can be little doubt that the ﬁ nancial crash of 2007-
08 constituted a shock to the global economy on a similar 
scale to the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the oil price 
hikes of 1973. In 2009, output fell in 34 out of 37 advanced 
economies, and the global economy as a whole went into 
recession for the ﬁ rst time since the Second World War. 
The resulting economic crisis has continued well beyond 
the initial events and, indeed, it continues a decade later.8 
The post-crash recovery has been the slowest in mod-
ern times, and a sense of continuing economic crisis has 
had signiﬁ cant political consequences. Most developed 
countries have experienced a rise of populist political par-
8 M. J a c o b s , M. M a z z u c a t o : Rethinking Capitalism: An Introduc-
tion, in: M. J a c o b s , M. M a z z u c a t o  (eds.): Rethinking Capitalism, 
Chichester 2017, Wiley Blackwell.
It is also vital to recognise that neoliberal governments 
and policies were sustained by powerful economic inter-
ests. It is not a coincidence that deregulation, privatisa-
tion, tax reductions and labour market ﬂ exibility beneﬁ t 
large corporations, ﬁ nancial ﬁ rms and wealthy individu-
als. Their support for such policies is manifested both 
politically, in extensive lobbying activities, and in dona-
tions to the neoliberal ecosystem. For example, the Atlas 
Network today provides international support and coor-
dination for around 400 think tanks in over 90 countries, 
with many now working to discredit the scientiﬁ c con-
sensus on anthropogenic climate change.
The return of social democracy: a modiﬁ ed paradigm?
By the 1990s, the conservative governments of the 
1980s had all been defeated. New centre-left govern-
ments made signiﬁ cant changes to the economic poli-
cies of their predecessors. Yet each retained key ele-
ments of the neoliberal consensus. Indeed, it has been 
widely argued – despite their own claims that they were 
following a new, “Third Way” approach – that the policies 
of the social democratic governments of the late 1990s 
and 2000s were essentially continuations of the neolib-
eral project.7
There is not space here to adjudicate opposing claims 
about speciﬁ c governments. But at an analytical level, it 
may be helpful to introduce the concept of a “modiﬁ ed 
paradigm”. It is hard to sustain the claim, for example, 
that New Labour was simply a Thatcherite government 
in disguise. In fundamental respects, it broke with the 
conservative consensus. Public spending was dramati-
cally increased to pay for the policy priority of improving 
public services. Major changes were also made in areas 
such as climate change and energy policy. Yet many 
key features of the neoliberal consensus remained. Pri-
vatisations were continued and further developed as 
outsourcing of public sector functions. The regulatory 
agenda in ﬁ nancial services and other business sectors 
was left unchanged. There were no reversals of laws 
placing burdens on trade unions or promoting the “ﬂ ex-
ible” labour market. Until a signiﬁ cant shift that began 
after the ﬁ nancial crisis, direct interventions in private 
sector investment through a more active industrial strat-
egy were eschewed.
This is why it may make sense to speak of Third Way gov-
ernments as executing a “modiﬁ ed” version of the neo-
7 A. G l y n  (ed.): Social Democracy in Neoliberal Times: The Left and 
Economic Policy Since 1980, Oxford 2001, Oxford University Press; 
and S. H a l l : The Neoliberal Revolution, in: Soundings, No. 48, 2011, 
pp. 9-27.
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and the World Economic Forum – espouse a narrative 
of “sustainable, inclusive growth”, based on an accept-
ance that the neoliberal model has generated both rising 
inequality and unsustainable environmental damage. At 
present, it would be hard to say that the consensus has 
gone beyond an acceptance of the failures of the domi-
nant model and agreement on a set of broader objectives 
for economic policy, but the OECD “New Approaches to 
Economic Challenges” initiative is now seeking a more 
coherent theoretical and policy response.
The UK is now perhaps the country furthest advanced 
in this ﬁ eld. It has a number of think tanks and cam-
paigning organisations more or less explicitly commit-
ted to the idea of a paradigm shift. Major think tanks, 
from the New Economics Foundation to IPPR, are call-
ing for a fundamental reform of economic policy. Phil-
anthropic foundations, including the Friends Provident 
Charitable Foundation, support projects promoting 
economic systems change. There is an active student 
movement, Rethinking Economics, campaigning for a 
reform of economic teaching, and an alternative eco-
nomics curriculum, CORE, which is gaining consider-
able attention.
The third level is that of political parties and govern-
ments. Here it is hard to discern any signiﬁ cant paradig-
matic transition in progress. Macron’s economic reforms 
are an attempt to modify the neoliberal orthodoxy. In 
Germany, neither the SPD nor the Greens have estab-
lished a coherent alternative economic platform – argu-
ably one of the reasons for their relatively poor showings 
in the 2017 general election. In the US, the Democratic 
Party remains split between the largely orthodox cen-
trism of its Clintonite wing and the radical yet incomplete 
economic programme of Bernie Sanders. It is arguably 
only the UK Labour Party that has committed to a radical 
break from neoliberalism and has a chance of winning 
power.
Conclusion
The parallels between present economic conditions and 
those in the two periods of the 20th century when ma-
jor paradigm shifts occurred are striking. History does 
not repeat itself, as Mark Twain supposedly said, but it 
often rhymes. There is certainly no guarantee that we will 
see a paradigm shift in economic thought and policy in 
the coming years. But the evidence that major reform is 
required is powerful, and there are clearly dynamics in 
academic economics, within economic institutions and in 
civil society tending in that direction. For those who would 
welcome change, the present moment offers both oppor-
tunity and challenge.
ties seeking to channel dissatisfaction with the economic 
status quo. There have been both right-wing and left-
wing manifestations, from Podemos to Trump. There has 
even been a revolt of the centre, in the form of Emmanuel 
Macron. While these movements differ in their degree of 
electoral success, they have stimulated a debate on the 
adverse impacts of globalisation and contemporary capi-
talism.
Breakdown and transition in orthodoxy
If the economic shocks and crises of the last decade are 
the precursors to a shift in the politico-economic para-
digm, it is clear that we are in its earliest stages. In most 
countries, mainstream economic policy has not yet un-
dergone any signiﬁ cant change, and there is little con-
sensus on what, if anything, ought to replace it. However, 
there are some signs of an emerging transition, at several 
levels. First, debate in the economic policy community, 
both among academics and in international institutions 
and think tanks, has begun to change. Modern econom-
ics is more pluralist than it was a generation ago. In recent 
years, the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences 
has frequently been awarded to practitioners working 
outside the neoliberal orthodoxy. In the English-speaking 
world, many of the most prominent economists contrib-
uting to public debate, such as Dani Rodrik and Mariana 
Mazzucato, are trenchant critics of neoliberal theory and 
policy. This is much less true, however, in other countries, 
notably Germany – though even here recent surveys of 
economists have shown a signiﬁ cant shift towards a less 
orthodox view.9
Yet at the same time, it is clear that no overarching “alter-
native” paradigm has yet emerged. While many prominent 
economists today share a critique of neoliberal orthodoxy, 
there has been little effort to articulate a shared alternative 
view which might incorporate and bind together elements 
of the new pluralism. This is partly because there are sig-
niﬁ cant differences of approach between different kinds 
of heterodox academic economists. The neo-Keynesian 
tradition disagrees with the free-market objectives and 
principles of neoliberalism but has an understanding of 
economic theory and policy that is otherwise recognis-
ably mainstream. Others, including those drawing from 
complexity theory or ecological economics, for example, 
seek a more radical reappraisal of economic theory.
Second, there is increasing interest in a signiﬁ cant shift 
in approach to policy within mainstream economic insti-
tutions. Three of the major international leaders in eco-
nomic thought and practice – the OECD, the World Bank 
9 T. F r i c k e , op. cit.
